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This essay examines the manner in which the colonial
question was viewed by the socialist movement in Europe,
beginning with Karl Marx, and culminating with the First
World War. It is an attempt not only to classify the various
socialist views toward this subject, but to suggest and
analyze the motivations which produced these outlooks.
Socialism, as an ideology, presented a major obstacle
to the early socialists when confronting the colonial ques-
tion. Though it implied a sense of universal equality and
"unity of the oppressed", its^economic laws were derived
from and applicable only to advanced, industrial states. Soc-
ialism, in its European form, was an irrelevant tool of
analysis. Additionally, socialism was an ideology signally
unsuited to deal with foreign policy.
European socialists were further confounded by having to
formulate policy in a national milieu. They were forced to
engage in practical politics and make political compromises,
not required of the ideology's early theorists. Also, the
European constituencies, whose support was necessary, were
highly nationalistic, and even jingoistic, in the "Golden Age

of Imperialism."
All socialists examined, excluding -Lenin and Karski,
manifested a sense of European superiority toward the colon-
ies, which lead to a "Western" view of the colonial question.
That is, the morality of any colonial policy was determined
by its ultimate effect on Europe. The colonies were treated
only as economic entities.
The Western "reformists" hope to utilize their "positive
colonial policy" to enrich Europe and to provide superior
colonial management. Many socialist militarists and national
chauvinists also aligned with the reformist position. However,
a small faction of reformists also show an inclination to
utilize this policy to improve the economic conditions of the
colonial natives, by taking an active responsibility for them.
The Western "orthodox" faction rejected colonialism "in
principle", because colonies were viewed as a source of wealth,
which could be used to buy off class-consciousness in Europe.
Recognition of the colonies would have endangered their belief
in the inevitability of revolution. Therefore, they chose a
"policy of avoidance", and hoped to get the entire socialist
movement to disavow it, by tying colonialism to militarism.
An "Eastern" view of colonialism, as put forth by Lenin,
lends significance to international equality and the ability

of Asiatics to engage in purposeful political activity. The
revolution in the East attains priority, in this view.
It is concluded that the Western views suffer from the
cultural relativism which inheres. However, all views fail
in conveying a sense of selfless charity for the oppressed
colonials. All socialist attitudes are products of expedient
political tactics, aimed solely at enhancing the political
position of socialism within a European state. The colonial
question, socialism's first opporiunity to convey this sense
of universalism inherent in the philosophy, became an instru-
ment of practical local politics.
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Socialism developed as a combined reaction to the social
injustice emanating from early European industrialization and
a sense of ability to master economic difficulty through
technology. The cause, properly managed, could provide the
cure. The illness to be treated was inequality. The oppressed
masses, themselves the creator of all value through their
labor, were awarded less economic benefit than they deserved.
Though socialists have perennially disputed the specific
form of equality (that of opportunity or condition; economic,
political or social) to be achieved and the tactics (revolution
or reform; production or distribution) to be employed, an
undeniable egalitarianism pervaded the philosophy.
However, socialism developed and operated within the
confines of nation-states, and was the product of an industrial
Western-European culture. Socialists implicitly acknowledged
that the popular acceptance, which they required to take
governmental power, would derive from local, European elec-
torates, within the national framework.




the two conflicting characteristics of European socialism,
universal egalitarianism and national parochialism, for the
first time. An ideological, as well as practical, dilemma
for socialism was created by the problem of colonialism. The
original socialist thinkers were conditioned exclusively by
local (European) phenomena and addressed the problems of the
masses only in industrial states. Tropical colonies were
originally not an issue. Factories, coal mines, and urban
slums were the target of socialist polemics. By the late
nineteenth century, the "coloureds" of the colonies had to
be incorporated into this system of beliefs. In sum, the
socialists of the late nineteenth century were faced with the
necessity of dealing with the^ colonial question in a charitable
and egalitarian manner because of their ideology. Yet, this
same ideology was unsuited to incorporate non-industrial masses,
Additionally, for tactical political purposes, the ideology
had to remain a palatable alternative for the local European
workers.
This essay will attempt to analyze the confused and con-
tradictory position toward the colonial question taken by the
leading European socialists, through the First World War.
1. Albert Fried and Ronald Sanders, ed. , Socialist Thought
,
(Garden City, New York, 1964,) The introduction pp. 1-13 treats
this point directly, but the selected readings of the early
socialists are in concurrence.
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The significance of this issue resides in the fact that it
presented the first opportunity for socialism to project its
principle of human equality beyond the domestic politics of
industrialized states.
Fittingly, Karl Marx was the first socialist to address
the matter of colonialism. His first realization that European
socialism was not developing in a vacuum was found in his
retort to Proudhon, The Poverty of Philosophy . In it, he
alluded to a theme that subsequently permeated European social-
ist thought: that every international phenomenon must be
analyzed by its effect on European politics. He evaluated
the role of the "millions of workers condemned to perish in
the East Indies," as ameliorating the condition of the British
proletariat by providing the latter with "three years of
2prosperity out of ten."
This attitude, expressed in 1846, is the core of what
will loosely be labelled the "Western" outlook on the colonial
question. That is, colonial policy must be judged on the
basis of its effect on the political situation within the
European colonizer. Because Europe was superior and more






important, it took priority over the colonies.
Marx's condescending attitude toward non-Europeans was
evident in much of his writing, but especially in the Communist
Manifesto of 1848. Here, he discussed the spread of capitalism
and remarked that, just as the country is dependent on the
towns, "so it has made barbarian countries dependent on the
3
civilized, ... the East on the West."
It was in 1853, when Marx wrote a series of articles for
the New York Daily Tribune , that his early position on colon-
ialism was elucidated. His dealing with Indian society was
characterized by an emphasis on its backwardness and stag-
nation. His primary point was that all colonies eventually
had to endure the process of "industrialization. Thus, the
introduction of British rule and the concomitant universal-
ization of capital, were a progressive and necessary step
toward eventual international socialism.
A sense of European superiority pervaded Marx's early
work on colonialism. He explicitly confirmed this in an
1853 article:
"Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Mongols, who had successively
overrun India, soon became Hinduized, the barbarian
conquerors being, by an eternal law of history, conquered
themselves by the superior civilization of their subjects.




The British were the first conquerors superior ... to
the Hindu civilization.
The core theory underlying his argument was that capitalist
development in Europe was creating a single world economic
system, with which all regions would inevitably join. They
would have to be "Europeanized" before they could be social-
ized. Capitalism was pictured as the unstoppable force
capable of bringing the mightiest (barbarian) civilizations
to their knees. Marx remarked of China, that it was "a
gratifying fact that the oldest and most unshakable empire
on earth should within eight years have been brought by the
cotton bales of the English Bourgeois to the eve of a social
5
revolution.
The root cause of oriental stagnation was traced to the
"Village System," which in Marx's opinion of 1853, had to be
eliminated. These villages were contaminated by the distinc-
tions of caste and slavery, and they subjugated the creative
talents of man. Marx added, that we must not
forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffen-
sive though they may appear, had always been the solid
4. All of Marx's articles to the New York Daily Tribune plus
much of his and Engel's correspondence are compiled in On
Colonialism
,
(New York, 1972.) This selection was taken from
an article entitled "The Future Results of British Rule in
India," p. 82.
5. Karl Marx, Marx on China
,
(London, 1951,) Tp. 52.
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foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained
the human mind within the smallest possible camp,
making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving
it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grand-
eur and historical energies.
In January, 1859, Marx gave a summary of his method that
indicated the exact relationship of the economic process to
the historical process. He saw four stages: "In broad out-
lines, Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes
of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the
7
economic formation of society." This lowest, "Asiatic Mode"
was a product of both the village system and climatic condi-
tions. The creation of private property in land and universal
capitalization would play the' major role of this mode's
dissolution.
Britain's role in India, thus, had a dual nature. By
introducing capitalism, it would introduce private property
(which lays the foundation for socialism, since private
property cannot be abolished before it is fully developed )




7. Karl Marx, Selected Works , Vol. I, (New York, 1972,)
.p. 363
8. Shlomo Avinieri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl
Marx, (Cambridge, 1970,) ^p. 168.
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and Indian modernization. This would, in turn, improve
internal communications and irrigation, and facilitate
eventual political unity. At that point, the economic sub-
structure necessary for a true proletarian revolution would
have been created. The growth of capitalism, through the
destruction of Asiatic society, would necessarily sow the
seeds of its own destruction. England would, unwittingly,
become a "tool of history" accelerating the grouth of inter-
national class consciousness.
Secondarily, Marx's anti-Russian bias was also manifest
in his discussion of India. Though he did not give England
the unqualified right to control India, he suggested that
British rule was superior to "*" India conquered by the Turk or
Q
by the Russian."
However, Marx also made allusions to another theme
common to all later European socialists: that colonialism
has historically produced numerous evils because of the
malevolence of its capitalist administrators. Perhaps English
rule was preferable to Russian, but the "whole rule of Britain
in India was swinish, and is to this day." The objection
was not to colonialism, per se, but to an inability to govern
9. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Op. cit. , p. 81.
10. Ibid., p. 315, Letter From Marx to Engels, June 14, 1853.
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efficiently and humanely. These maledictions arose from the
inherently selfish interests of capitalists, and the impli-
cation was that beter administration could make a colonial
policy beneficial to both metropole and colony.
The Marxian position toward colonialism was apparently
one of reluctant acceptance, recognizing that this policy was
a necessary evil. Though coercion and injustice have been
its concomitants, colonial practices were viewed as the only
potential progressive forces which could drag the "Orient"
through the successive modes of production. The analysis
was exclusively economic and tended to project economic theories
derived from European states directly on to the colonies.
Subsequently, Marx reversed his position on the economic
effect of India on England, but unfailingly analyzed the
situation in European terms. In 1857, Marx wrote to Engels,
that the military and naval expenses of defending large
colonies were becoming an economic burden on England, and
that "this dominion ... threatens to cost quite as much as
it can ever be expected to come to." However, these expenses
were viewed as welcome forces accelerating the inevitable
crises caused by the contradictions of capitalism. Marx
11. Ibid., pp. 171-172, taken from "British Incomes in India,"
published in the New York Daily Tribune , September 21, 1857.
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noted further, that "with the drain of men and bullion which
it must cost the English, India is now our best ally . . . ,,x*
The colonies helped to create an economic situation which
stimulated class consciousness in Euope, and enhanced the
likelihood of a socialist revolution.
Until 1867, the European Revolution was not only con-
sidered more important than any activity in the colonies,
but it was also felt that it must necessarily occur earlier.
That is, only when socialists were in power in the mother
country could colonies be managed properly and guided toward
independence and socialism. However, Marx revised this tem-
poral sequence in his consideration of the Irish question.
He expressed the view that the English working class would
never accomplish any worthwhile political activity until the
British political system was shaken by the loss of Ireland.
Though his opinion was still decidedly Western, this compromise
opened the door to all the "Asiocentric" visions of the world
revolution, which were to be propagated (by Mao, for example)
once Asia had ceased to be a mere economic object of analysis.
12. Ibid., p. 321, Letter From Marx to Engels, January 14,
1858.
13. Helene d'Encasse Carrere and Stuart R. Schramm, Marxism
and Asia, (Baltimore, 1969,) p. 15.
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This new attitude, which insisted on the primacy of the
Western Revolution, but allowed for some political activity
(i.e. national revolution, independence) in the colonies at
an earlier date, will be labelled the "adapted Western" out-
look on the colonial question.
Throughout his life, Marx's judgment of the colonial
question was removed from moralistic anti-imperialism. The
management and excesses of colonialism were deplored, but it
was substantially defended as a progressive economic step
toward international socialism. His unswerving belief in
the omnipotence of capitalism, and its ability to alter the
ossified societies of the Orient, bolstered his economic
interpretation of the phenomenon.
The colonial examples employed by Marx fell into both
European (Ireland, Poland) and tropical (India, Burma, China)
classes. Both groups were consistently analyzed as they af-
fected their parent stated, but only the former were considered
potential national entities by Marx. Though he eventually
terminated his disdain for the tropical colonies and the
"Asiatic Mode of Production," Marx never explicitly acknow-
ledged their intrinsic right to independence or equality.
Though Frederick Engels, Marx's counterpart, spent even
less time writing on the colonial question, he introduced
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several lines of analysis on the subject which were to be
often repeated. Near Marx's death in 1882, Engels wrote to
the next arbiter of Marxian dogma, Karl Kautsky, specifically
on the colonial question.
He, too, divided the colonies into two separate groups,
those occupied by a white European population and those
occupied by "natives." The former were considered responsible
enough to achieve independence with no assistance, while the
latter "must be taken over for the time being by the (European)
proletariat and led" toward eventual independence.
Engels' attitude toward colonies was definitely of the
"Western" variety, though he evolved into roughly the same
position Marx took in later life. As of 1882, the idea that
the bourgeois-national revolution of the colonies might actually
precede the establishment of socialism in Europe never occurred
to Engels. The capitalist development of the colonies was
considered progressive for the backward areas, but would nave
no direct effect on world affairs. However, by 1894,
Engels readily admitted that this link did exist and that the
"conquest of China by capitalism will . . . furnish the impulse
14. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Op. cit. , >p. 341, letter
from Frederick Engels to Karl Kautsky, September 12, 1882.
15. Demetrio Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the National and
Colonial Question 1917-1928, (Geneva, 1957,) pp. 25.
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for the overthrow of capitalism in Europe."-'-"
His main colonial concern, earlier in life, was that the
additional wealth supplied by dependencies would retard the
European Revolution. This analysis was the cornerstone
around which "orthodox" Marxists were to predicate their
anti-colonial polemics. Essentially, Engels observed that
the English proletariat showed a propensity to "gaily share
in the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and
the colonies," thereby inproving their economic position.
This development belies Marx's theory of constantly increasing
misery, which insisted that the workers' level of both absol-
ute and relative deprivation were continually being aggravated,
It is this situation which facilitated the development of
class consciousness, which impelled the Socialist Revolution.
If the proletariat could be "bought off" by the bourgeoisie,
the revolution became even more distant. In 1882, Engels
noted that the lack of class consciousness in England was
almost at a critical level, when he wrote: "you ask me what
the English workers think about colonial policy? Well, exactly
the same as they think about politics in general: The same
16. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Op. cit.
, p. 347, letter




as the bourgeois think."
He hinted in other writings that Marx's concept of the
"aristocracy of labor" was being realized, specifically be-
cause of the possession of colonies. This regressive trend
could only be ended by dissolving all ties with one's depen-
dencies. Though orthodox Marxists rallied around this analysis,
Engels' superior attitude toward the tropical colonies pro-
vided "reformist" socialists of a later date, with a rationale
to justify a policy of tutelage and paternalism. Yet,
throughout his writing, is found his European sense of super-
iority and the priority of European political development.
The outlook of Marx and Engels on colonialism was not,
in itself, of great significance in contemporary politics.
Neither theorist was actively commanding a national political
party. Yet, their ideas certainly held great sway among the
growing number of European socialists, especially in their
native Germany.
Eventually, debate on the colonial question would not only
be carried on in Marxian terminology, but policies were deemed
acceptable largely on their substantiation by previous pro-
nouncements by Marx or Engels. Indeed, the roots of opposing
colonial policies could be found in their writings.




With the inception of the International Workingmen '
s
Association (I.W.A.) of 1864, Marx was accepted as the spir-
itual head of socialism, and remained in control of the
body's General Council throughout its short life. His attempt
to inject a sense of solidarity of the oppressed in the I.W.A.
was apparent in the First Colonial Pronouncement of Inter-
national Socialism, aimed at the political equality of a race
enslaved by oppressive colonizers: the Negro slaves of the
Confederacy during the American Civil War. President Lincoln
was described as the "single minded son of the working class,
who was destined to lead the country through the matchless
-v IP
struggle for the rescue of an unchained race." i0 The I.W.A.
urged all workers to endure the hardships of the cotton crisis,
until the oppressed slaves were freed.
It is worthwhile to note that the First International
was never engaged in any activity which required that it be
consistent with this principle. The "alliance of the oppressed"
was rarely invoked, in fact, beyond national boundaries. This
was also an ominous foreboding for future socialists.
18. Minutes of the General Council of the First International
cited in Julius Braunthal, History of the International 1864-
1914, (New York, 1967,) p. 306.
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The I.W.A. did not succeed for many reasons, including
the lack of financial support from German socialists under
LaSalle. He reasoned that the oppressed worders of France were
not deserving of help from the German proletariat. Also, the
ongoing struggle of the "anti-authoritarian" faction of Bakunin
and Proudhon resisted the demand of the Marxists to centralize
the organization of the body. In 1872, for fear of losing
control of the association to the anarchists, Marx spitefully
moved its headquarters to New York, where it was certain to
fade into oblivion. The International formally expired in
1876.
Shortly after the demise^of the International, both soc-
ialism and colonialism rapidly grew in importance in European
politics. Socialist parties, increasingly under Marxian in-
fluence, were founded in every section of Europe in the 1870*
s
and early 80' s. Simultaneously, the "Golden Age" of Imperial-
ism and ruthless division of all the tropical land of the
world, was in its incipient stage.
The numerous causes of this sudden surge of imperialism
19have been analyzed in detail elsewhere, but there exist
19. William L. Langer (The Diplomacy of Imperialism ) offers
the most comprehensive and convincing group of reasons behind
this expansive drive, pp. 67-99. However, D. K. Fieldhouse
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sufficiently few common causes, so that the success of early
socialism can be considered distinct from it. Much of the
popularity of the socialist movement derived from the fact
that it was an uncompromising spokesman for the worker, which
would agitate for meaningful internal social and political
reform. Universal suffrage and increased wages were part of
the platform of virtually every party. The social Democrats
rejected the evils of industrialism and insisted on a more
equitable distribution of wealth within the country in ques-
tion. Essentially, socialism was an internal force, with al-
most exclusively domestic, short-term goals. This was the
case, both in its initial theoretical conception, and in
practice, since its power ultimately rested on the mass support
of a country's workers. It was an ideology signally unsuited
to deal with foreign affairs, since its final goal (as Marx
would have it) was the destruction of the nation-state. August
Bebel, a later head of the German Social Democrats, stated
succinctly the socialist aversion to international affairs:
"I know that a great number of our comrades, of they so much
as hear about foreign policy, prefer to shrug their shoulders.
(Economics and Empire ) labels these explanations "Eurocentric,"
and embarks on a "peripheral," though less convincing, solution.
A. P. Thornton ( Doctrines of Imperialism ) groups the various
reasons into three divisions: Doctrines of Power, Doctrines
of Profit, and Doctrines of Civilization.
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20With some justification." u
Because of the growth of the socialist movement in the
1880" s, it necessarily assumed a role in the practical politics
of most European states. Politicians, rather than theoretic-
ians, assumed leadership of most of these movements. Unfor-
tunately, many of the European states in which socialism was
prominent had adopted foreign policies which entailed colon-
ialism by the turn of the century. Thus, socialism was con-
fronted with incorporating this "foreign" substance into its
doctrine, if it was to remain a relevant political force.
The leading socialist movement of Europe was formed in
21 ~^Germany under LaSalle in the 1860's. However, LaSalle's
party dogmatized the popular conviction that force and violence
could not assist any radical cause. Rather, its policy chose
the state as the means to achieve political democracy. In fact,
LaSalle was a Prussian who supported nationalism and federal-
ism, under Prussian domination, for all Germans. His hatred
20. August Bebel, in an address to the Erfurt Congress of the
German S.P.D., 1891, cited in James Joll, The Second Inter-
national 1889-1914
,
(New York, 1956,) p. 114.
21. LaSalle's original mane was Lasal, but he decided early
in life to change it to this French form, since he felt that
anything French imparted a revolutionary quality.
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for the German Progressives often forced him into alliances
with the Conservatives in the Reichstag.
The Bavarians, William Liebknecht and August Bebel,
headed the Marxist, anti-Prussian wing of the party. In 1869,
they seceded and formed the German Social Democratic Party
(S.P.D.), based on the more revolutionary, Marxian doctrine.
The two factions united under the Gotha Programme of 1875,
with the LaSalleans out-numbering the Eisenachers (Marxists)
by 16,000 to 9,000. This Program was totally reformist in
nature, with only minor concessions made to the Marxists.
Marx personally protested vigorously from London, upon reading
the fundamental policy adopted at Gotha. By 1875, the united
party polled in excess of 350,000 votes and had nine repre-
sentatives in the Reichstag.
Bismarck outlawed the Socialist Party in 1878 and simul-
taneously embarked on a policy of conservative paternalism and
social reform. The Socialists adopted a passive attitude
toward this persecution and continued to attract voters to the
party. By 1890, when the anti-Socialist Laws were repealed,
the S.P.D. was polling almost 1.5 million votes.
22. Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme was originally his
marginal notes written on a copy of this programme, sent to
him in England, for criticism. His critique was so extensive
and vituperative, that it became a work unto itself.
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The Engels-inspired Erfurt Programme was adopted in 1890
by the S.P.D., but the revolutionary rhetoric it contained,
was just that. The party, Carlton J.H. Hayes maintains, in-
creasingly attracted members of the German trade unions, along
with a considerable segment of the middle class. This in-
consistency provoked interminable debate between the orthodox
and reformist factions of the S.P.D. , which had its repercus-
sions in colonial policy.
Edward Bernstein, the father of German Revisionism, first
suggested that the S.P.D. adopt a colonial policy similar to
the pro-Imperial Liberals of Great Britain because "socialism
is its (Liberalism's) legitimate heir, not only in chronological
sequence, but also in its spiritual qualities." 4 Such a policy
would be highly nationalistic, and by injecting a strong ele-
ment of paternalism, would make imperialism a more palatable
and humane policy.
Bernstein advocated outright imperialism, primarily because
it would benefit Germany and the German working class by providing
the requisite raw materials and security for an incipient
23. Carlton J.H. Hayes, "The Influence of Political Tactics
on Socialist Theory in Germany 1867-1914," in Charles E. Merriam
and Harry E. Barnes, ed. , A History of Political Theories
,
(New York, 1924,) >p. 289.
24. Edward Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and
Affirmation
,
(New York, 1909,) ;p. 149.
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major-power. He noted that Germany imported a considerable
amount of colonial produce, and that the- time might come when
"it will be desirable to draw . . . these products from our
own colonies." 25 Since, he reasoned, it was not reprehensible
to enjoy the produce of tropical plantations, it could not be
immoral to cultivate such plantations themselves.
For fear that China would come under the control of
Germany's colonial adversaries, Bernstein proclaimed that "in
all questions concerning China, Germany should have a word to
say." Germany's acquisition of Kiaochow Bay was defended
as allowing her a stronghold to protect China from either
dependence on Russia of division by other European states.
Germany, he continued, "could nake her influence felt at any
time on the situation of things in China, instead of being
obliged to content herself with belated protests."
He justifies colonialism on the grounds that savages had
only a conditional right to land they occupied, since the
"higher civilization ultimately can claim a higher right,"
28because only it can properly cultivate the land. He cited
25. Ibid., p. 172.
26. Ibid., ip. 173.






Marx in his defense, noting that it was obligatory that soci-
eties improve the land and its production, of lose claim to
29it.
Because he had explicitly denied Marx's theory of increas-
ing misery, he insisted that the acquisition of colonies would
not impede the realization of socialism by providing more wealth.
Indeed, this process would accelerate the evolution toward
socialism through amelioration of the condition of the German
proletariat. The revolution was an illusory dream, with or
without colonies. At worst, Bernstein argued, socialists
should treat the colonial question without prejudice, since
colonies would have little immediate effect on the social con-
ditions of Germany.
In addition, he demanded that a socialist colonial policy
not beinjurious to the natives of the colonies, a concept
novel to contemporary socialists. However, he took a much
more sanguine view of capitalist colonialism than other soc-
ialists, noting that present policy had rarely hindered the
natives in their enjoyment of life. The only obvious flaw he
perceived in colonialism was that it aggravated naval and
military chauvinism, which could lead to war.
29. Karl Marx, Capital , Vol. II, (Moscow, 1959,) pp. 652-653.




Though all facets of Bernsteinian Revisionism were offi-
cially rejected at the national Congressof Hanover (1889),
many German socialists remained loyal followers of Bernstein.
Some were prepared to adopt an even more extreme nationalistic
and paternalistic colonial policy. Quessel urged that Germany
and Great Britain conclude an agreement for the peaceful division
31
of the world. Edouard David suggested that colonialism
become an "integral part of the universal cultural aims of the
op
socialist movement."
Within the camp of German socialism was also the most
revolutionary group of orthodox Marxists, who opposed Bernstein
at every turn. Led by Kar Liebknecht (William's son) and Rosa
Luxemburg, they derived a position on colonialism antithetical
to that of the reformists.
Imperialism was viewed as the inherent outgrowth of the
corrupt capitalist society. It was considered to be the last
stage, or ultimate contradiction, of capitalism, which would
33destroy itself when the last bit of territory was consumed.
Colonialism was not an accidental result, but was the inevitable









consequence of profit-seeking economies. In a sinister way,
the ultimate effect of colonialism was "progressive." The
German Marxists averred that colonialism provided the "mater-
ial conditions for the destruction of capitalism and the
abolition of class society. In this sense, imperialism, too,
is working in our interest."
Every aspect of the colonialization process was, however,
reprehensible, and to be condemned as unalterably evil. Karl
Liebknecht propounded a direct connection between colonialiam
and militarism. Most socialists, including Bernstein, admitted
that colonial rivalries increased the tension, which induced
European states to engage in arms races, making general war
more probable. Colonialism, therefore, assumed an even worse
quality, because it could lead to the loss of European lives,
as well as heavier taxation of the European worker.
Rosa Luxemburg, while accepting Liebknecht' s thesis,
developed a more complicated analysis of the colonial and na-
tional question. In The Accumulation of Capital , she put forth
her economic theory of the phenomenon. Capitalism, she held,
could continue to expand as long as there were non-capitalist
regions to supply resources and to act as markets for European
34. Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and Franz Mehring, The
Crisis In German Social Democracy (The Junius Pamphlet,) (New
York, 1918,) p. 124.
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overproduction. When this was no longer possible, capitalism
35
would collapse.
In her political writings, Luxemburg characterized the
"imperial stage" as an aggravated condition of capitalist
society, which had to be defined by the effects it had on
Europe. She hoped to use this international issue to galvan-
ize the S.P.D. into advocating more radical political action,




Thus, she was outspoken in her criticism of Germany's
imperial adventures into China (1900) and Morocco (1905) , but
never developed a political policy for colonial countries,
nor gave the colonies any recommendations as to how they might
resist this subjugation. Imperialism was simply the instrument
which could create the requisite revolutionary spirit in the
S.P.D. and the German workers - a means of curing the party's
lethargy.
By 1905, she was convinced that imperialism had permeated
every corner of the world to such a degree that national struggle
-5-7
in the colonies was no longer possible. In fact, nationalism




36. J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxenburg, (London, 1966,) p. 536.
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had an evil effect on European workers, since the proletariat
merely followed the leadership of the national bourgeoisie.
Thus, excluding several polemics condemning the evils of col-
onialism, she tended to ignore the colonial question, except
when exploiting it for domestic purposes. Her activity was
invariably concentrated on the European revolutionary struggle.
Time spent trying to ameliorate the condition of the colonies,
as long as Europe was in the clutches of capitalism, was time
lost. Her position was later summarized in the Junius Brochure :
"So long as capitalist states exist, there can be no national
self-determination, either in war of peace." 00
Karl Kautsky, the most influential Marxist theorist of
his day, clung to what might Be called a "strategy of attrition,"
with respect to the colonial question. He foresaw a growing
socialist force eventually overwhelming the imperialists.
This inevitability allowed him to continue to preach his self-
proclaimed "orthodox" rhetoric, while supporting reformist ac-
tivities. His profound optimism in "scientific socialism" led
him to the conclusion that the colonial problem would vanish,
if ignored.
The revolutionary Marxists of Germany, thus, formulated
37. Boersner, Op. cit.
, p. 43.




the basic policy of all subsequent "Western" orthodox Marxists,
much as the German Revisionists did for the "Western" Reformists,
with respect to colonial policy. The orthodox faction con-
demned colonialism not only because its management was inef-
ficient and brutal; they opposed it in principle as well. It
was recognized that colonialism aggravated the contradictions
of capitalism, but its collapse was inevitable, at any rate.
Militarism and war, the concomitants of colonialism, were
considered injurious to the local population, and a force del-
eterious to the outbreak of revolution. The logic was simple:
war galvanized the nationalist spirit and offered an excuse to
repress the socialists.
Their primary aim was always the European Revolution, and
the colonies were only a distraction. Further, activity in
the colonies was fruitless, since progress was hopeless without
the European Revolution. Sympathy abounded for the colonies,
but no policy for them was formulated, because the problem
would dissipate as capitalism self-destructed.
The German Social Democrats, as a group, first discussed
the colonial question at the Mainz Congress of 1900. The
eventuating resolution closely resembled the position of the
orthodox revolutionaries, with only minor deviations. Colon-
ialism was judged to have originated because of the insatiable
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demands for markets and investment outlets by the bourgeoisie.
This practice was inherently ruthless, unjust, and coercive,
and made the "exploiting elements" more savage than the natives,
The Congress demanded that the rights of all people be pre-
served and that only instruction and good example could lead
the colonies toward independence.
The British socialist movement dates its origins to 1882
and the formation of the Social Democratic Federation (S.D.F.)
by H. M. Hyndman. This Marxist party was joined, the next
year, by the Fabian Society. In 1893, Keir Hardie created the
Scottish-based Independent Labout Parth (I.L.P.).
British socialism developed a different character than
that on the continent. England's early development of indus-
trialization had apparently created pressures for reform on
the British political system (e.g., the Chartists,) prior to
the acceptance of Marxist revolutionary rhetoric on the con-
tinent. By the late nineteenth century, most Britons had been
successfully diverted from revolutionary tactics by these re-
forms. Thus, even Hyndman's S.D.F. , orthodox by British
standards, showed little flair for revolution. Joll remarks
that British socialists were "somewhat incomprehensible to




most European socialists, and lay outside the mainstream of
the movement, sometimes rather consciously, and even regret-
fully.'"^ This accounts for the fact that despite vast support
and undeniable interest in the colonial question, their in-
fluence in International Congresses was minimal.
Through its "permeation" tactics, the Fabian Society had
a significant effect on the entire British socialist movement.
The leaders of every major socialist group were at least
nominally Fabians, as were five of eight members of the Execu-
tive Council of the Labour Representative Committee, a synthesis
of the three groups (Fabians, I.L.P. and S.D.F.) which even-
tually became the Labour Party, in 1906. -1-
Before the outbreak of the Boer War in October, 1899,
British socialists paid no heed to foreign policy. They were,
in the words of E. R. Pease, "derisively regarded as experts
in the politics of the parish pump." 42 This insular view was
interrupted only by random attacks on some aspects of British
policy in India. However, the South African War forced the
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socialists to deal with the colonial question.
Hyndman's S.D.F. had earlier condemned the Jameson Raid
on the Transvaal. However, shortly after his speech at the
Paris Congress of 1900, in which he labelled England the aggres-
sor, he reversed his position because of the unanimous anti-
. . . 43 .British reaction. His patriotic tendencies prevailed. The
S.D.F. , then not only reverted to a pro-British policy in
South Africa, but supported British militarism, as a necessity
for survival. Hyndman declared that "our existence as a
nation of free men depends on our supremacy at sea. This can
be said of no other people of the present day. However much
we socialists are naturally opposed to armaments, we must,
however, recognize facts.' The use of force, therefore, was
condoned for nationalistic reasons, but also viewed as a tool
to strengthen and develop the common good and human happiness,
if applied properly by an enlightened people. ->
Though Hyndman had consistently attacked England's policy
in India, he never contested the British right to colonize.
43. Chushichi Tsuzuki, H^ M^ Hyndman and British Socialism
,
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He possessed first-hand knowledge of the effects of colonialism
on the sub-continent, but favored some form of Indian ties with
46Britain. He simply desired a more equitable partnership
between the two actors.
Later, his opinion of the quality of British rule grew
less favorable and he acknowledged that the "mischief" Britain
had wrought, outweighed any reforms. Trade had been opened
with bloodshed. But the eventual reason that he offered for
severing ties with India in 1919 were consummately "Western."
His first concern was with England, as he noted: "The posses-
sion of India has been a curse to England, alike in her domestic
and foreign affairs. Democracy at home has greatly suffered
by the maintenance of despotism abroad." 47 Further, he decried
the fact that the defense of the colonies fell squarely on
the backs of the British working-class taxpayers.
Hyndman's goals were largely reformist, and his stance on
the colonial question closely mirrored that of Bernstein. He
considered the effects of colonies on the metropole, and dis-
played a strong current of nationalism. He was orthodox only
in British socialism.
46. Tsuzuki, Op. cit.
, p. 127.






The Independent Labour Party initially denounced the
British intervention and attributed the cause of the Boer War
to capitalist profit-seeking. However, Robert Blatchford, the
Party's most influential member, immediately threw his weight
behind the venture. His socialist newspaper, the Clarion , was
the most popular source of socialist opinion in England. He
held that a British victory would enhance her wealth, thereby
48benefitting the masses. Ledebour, a leading German Marxist,
accused him of forcing his daughter to play "Rule Britannia"
49for him every night of the Boer War.
Before the Boer War, the Fabian Society was simply a
group of moderate socialist intellectuals, devoted to domestic
social and political reform. Their distinctly parochial view,
even in the face of the War, was attributed partially to the
realization that it would cause a split in the Society.
Matters of foreign policy were considered irrelevant. Fabian
Tract No . 70 did not mention the colonial question, thereby
rendering it a "prohibited degree," not within the purview of
51Fabian interests. The Fabians had no immediate comment on
48. Tsuzuki, Op. cit.
, p. 128.
49. Joll, Op. cit.
, p. 123.
50. McBriar, Op. cit.
, p. 119.




On December 8, 1899, however, a faction led by S. G.
Hobson and J. Ramsay MacDonald urged that the Society adopt
a "measure of sympathy" in behalf of the Boers, but the idea
was rejected on the grounds of irrelevance. A postal referendum
was then conducted in February, 1900, ostensibly to determine
whether or not the Society would take a stand on the issue
of British imperialism. The reasons for opposing such a stand
centered around the fact that it would be futile, as well as
irrelevant. This position, advocated by G. B. Shaw, Sidney
Olivier, and Sidney Webb, was not, on the surface, a justifi-
cation of colonial warfare. Shaw's faction won by a 259-217
vote.
However, Margaret Cole's thesis that Shaw was "frankly
iritated" by the War, and that the Webbs "did not want to be
bothered" is highly questionable in light of the facts. Sidney
Webb was known to have opted for an imperial policy, in alliance
with the Liberal Imperialists, in order to obtain more influence
CO
over their domestic policy. Sidney Olivier was preparing a
Policy," deals with the mission and tactics of the Society,
and presents twelve resolutions. The eighth resolution, "war
and foreign policy" denounces militarism, but concedes that
international solidarity must remain impossible "until the
antagonism of social interests ... is dissolved." No specific




lecture, whose theme was that "small nations which did not
seem able to manage their own internal difficultiew were not
CO
nations at all, and should be properly policed." On the
final day of the referendum, Shaw gave a speech in defense of
"imperialism." 5 ^ Thus, Fabian members quite clearly understood
that the referendum was a question of imperialism v. anti-
imperialism, and still chose to support Shaw. Fifteen members
of the minority faction resigned, including Hobson and
MacDonald.
It was determined that the Society would then take a formal
stand on colonialism. Fabianism and the Empire , the result of
this decision, was edited later in 1900 by G. B. Shaw, with
the approval of the majority of the Society. Surprisingly,
it dwelt primarily on domestic issues, noting that Fabianism
was an outgrowth of liberalism. When the exhaustion of liberal
ideas lead to the disappearance of liberal leadership, "liber-
alism would be supplanted in its representation of progressive
52. Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform
,
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Shaw made his case in support of colonialism from a
position of intrinsic British superiority. Though he preferred
a World Federation as the ideal colonizer, he suggested that,
until this became a reality, "we must accept the most respon-
se
cible imperial federation available as a substitute for it."
The greatest dangers of empire were perceived as misman-
agement, inefficiency, and disruption. Large empires were
inherently superior to smaller ones because of their capacity
for greater efficiency through specialization. Empires managed
by capitalists did not necessarily enhance international civil-
ization, which was the ultimate criterion for empire manage-
ment. Fabian socialism, it was argued, could produce the
"brains and political science" urgently needed to run the
55. George Bernard Shaw, Fabianism and the Empire, (London,
1900,) p. 101.
56. Ibid, p. 24. In 1913, the Fabian position on the uniquely
superior quality of British imperialism, is summed up by E. R.
Pease, Secretary to the Fabian Society, in an introduction to
Thomas Kirkup, A History of Socialism
,
(London, 1913,): "The
majority at Congresses has without reserve condemned the system
of establishing colonies in the tropics as merely an extension
of the field of exploitation of the capitalist class. This
does not refer to the colonial system of England, insofar as
it consists in the development of self-governing communities,
and the Congresses have perhaps hardly appreciated the value




colonies. Thus, possessions were not only acceptable (under
socialist influence,) but the more numerous, the better.
The Fabians advocated an explicitly bifurcated policy
with respect to the colonies. An ethnic superiority was pre-
supposed by the following statement:
... as for parliamentary institutions for native races,
that dream has long been disposed of. We thus have two
imperial policies: a democratic policy for povinces in
which the white colonists are in a large majority, and a
bureaucratic policy where the majority consists of coloured
natives.
Within tropical colonies, Shaw stressed, certain guarantees
must be made to the white inhabitants.
The principle of free trade was invoked as justification
for intervention in the affairs of an underdeveloped area.
Shaw pointed out that local government must be capable both
of keeping peace and enforcing agreements, or lose its legitim-
acy. At that point, a foreign trading power not only may, but
indeed must, set up a viable government. A similar line of
reasoning was utilized concerning the right to resources. Those
powers which could extract mineral wealth had the obligation
to stimulate the world economy by so doing, regardless of their
57. Shaw, Op. cit.
, p. 93.
58. Ibid., p. 16.




A final argument for colonialism was purely competitive.
Since all other powers are engaging in annexation, Britain
must ensure that she was not left behind. The moral dilemma
as to whether to leave China alone is answered rhetorically:
fin
"but how, if the other powers will not leave her alone?"
After incessant attacks from anti-imperial liberal groups
led by J. A. Hobson, the Fabians attempted to dissociate "public-
spirited imperialism" from emotional, patriotic jingoism.
They insisted that this confusion had given them a bad reput-
ation in foreign policy matters. Gradually conceding this
association, they, unobtrusively, ceased making pronouncements
in colonial policy until after the creation of their "Research
Groups." 61
In sum, the Fabians insisted on stringent controls in the
tropical colonies, ostensibly, to keep them from reverting to
a state of anarchic "black slavery." This policy of tutelage
and paternalism was aimed at educating the natives to a point
where they would deserve independence. Ultimately, most refor-
mist Socialists came to embrace this brand of paternalism.
This humaneness was meant to arouse a sense of "public-spirited
60. Ibid., p. 54.




imperialism," and to add to that already pervasive sentiment
of national chauvinism implanted by the likes of Seeley and
Dilke. In Fabian terms, a colonial policy could be beneficial
to the entire world: Europeans would gain additional wealth
while the tropical natives could be educated and led toward
European-style statehood.
The Labour Representative Committee passed an anti-imper-
ialist resolution at the behest of Keir Hardie during its First
Annual Congress in 1901. However, all future resolutions on
colonial and foreign policy were considered out of order. At
no time did governmental colonial policy provoke any serious
disagreement within the L.R.C., or cause it seriously to con-
sider invoking sanctions against the government. The Labour
Party, formed in 1906, took no stand on the colonial question.
French socialism is a history of splinter groups rarely
able to arrive at complete agreement. Though random socialist
candidates polled a substantial percentage of the vote as early
as the 1860's, it was not until 1886 that Guesde united the
National Federation of Trade Unions under an orthodox Marxist
policy. However, socialist factions to the right and left of
this party formed shortly thereafter, and became political
62. Ibid., p. 337.
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forces to be reckoned with.
R. F. Betts notes that the French colonial empire was
CO
amassed in • the face of public apathy, if not antipathy. J It
was not until the turn of the century, when France arranged a
treaty with Russia and passed the Finance Law of 1900, that
the French public fell wholeheartedly behind this policy.
At this time, the only outspoken critic of the French imperial
strategy was a majority of the socialists. One notable ex-
ception, however, was the eloquent reformist leader, Jean
Jaures
.
Perhaps the reason that there was little internal debate
surrounding the colonial question in the party was that it was
preoccupied with the issue of ministerialisme , or whether a
socialist could become a minister in a bourgeois government.
The Independents, Allemanists, and Possibilists supported
Millerand's governmental cabinet post against the onslaught of
the Guesdists and Blanquists.
Jaures accepted the Marxist contention that imperialism
grew from capitalism, but he could never bring himself to op-
pose French colonialism, due to his patriotic nationalism. In
his newspaper, La Petite Republique , he wrote in May, 1896:
63. Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French
Colonial Theory 1890-1914, (New York, 1961,) p. 1-5.
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The Law of expansion and conquest to which all peoples
yield seems as irresistible as the natural law; even
though we denounce eloquently all the villainies, all
the corruptions, all the cruelties of the colonial
movement, we shall not stop it. "4
He is mistakenly treated as a vehement anti-colonialist,
because of his demand for the emancipation of Cuba, India, and
the Philippines, and his criticism of French policy in the
Moroccan Crisis of 1905." However, the first response was
a reflection of his attitude toward other colonizers, and the
latter manifested his overarching fear of war with Germany.
With respect to French colonial policy, which did not imply
general war, he took a different view.
In 1901, he fully endorsed the Boxer expedition as an
excellent example of international co-operation. With respect
to China, he noted that "it is impossible to stop (French)
expansion, suddenly to halt the vital energies of a nation."
64. Cited in Harold R. Weinstein, Jean Jaures ; A Study of
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reconcile Jaures' voting record on military credits and his
reformist views with his outspoken denunciation of French
action in the Moroccan Crisis. He implies that Jaures took
this pro-German stand because of his affinity for the German
S.P.D.




In 1904, he defended inperialism as benefitting both the
European workers and natives.
In the 1898 conflict over the Sudan, he insisted on the
French right to establish communications between the Congo
Basin and the Nile Basin. He demanded that France defend
67
"her dignity and her rights." The 1903 revolt in Morocco
prompted him to note that France had to take "moral action"
against all Moslems, because of her rightful interests in North
CO
Africa. His formal stand on colonialism revolved around
ensuring that no colonial conflicts developed into general
69
wars, and providing "humane treatment" for the natives. At
no point does he suggest that France emancipate her colonies,
but, rather, that she learn to manage them in a more humane
fashion, while using them to provide increased wealth for the
French worker.
Guesde was conspicuously silent on the colonial question,
but viewed with disgust the reformist tactic of providing the
government with the "ways and means of conducting this colonial
policy," which would likely develop the permanent hazard of
70
war. To Guesde, foreign affairs was only a peripheral matter,
67. Ibid., p. 145.




while the main issue was domestic (labor reforms, as well as
governmental collaboration.)
The socialist parties of the Scandinavian states were
based on the German model. By 1890, the social democrats of
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark had adopted, outright, the German
Gotha Programme of 1875. This liberal, reformist trend attract-
ed substantial numbers of votes in each country by the turn of
the century. A more radical faction gained control of the
71party in Norway, due to Norway's more rapid industrialization.
However, the colonial question was totally irrelevant to the
region, excepting Denmark, which controlled Greenland and the
Faeroe Islands.
On the centenary of the French Revolution, the Second
79International was created in Paris. '* In its attempt to create
a universal socialist force, while retaining its respectability,
70. Aaron Noland, The Founding of the French Socialist Party
1893-1905
,
(Cambridge, 1956,) p. 170.




72. Actually, two International Socialist Congresses met in
Paris in 1889: the Marxists and the Possibilists. The latter
group was initially larger, but due to the defection of the
British S.D.F. and continual interruptions of the Anarchists,
the Marxist group predominated.
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the Congress adopted a membership policy which allowed virtually
any faction which adhered to the most general socialist prin-
•7-3
ciples, while excluding the anarchists. /J Gerhart Niemeyer
has compared the organization of this International with the
League of Nations. ^ Each national party was an autonomous
unit insisting on the right to determine its own policy. The
body had no power to enforce its decisions on a national party.
The Secretariat was simply a clearing house for resolutions,
while the Permanent Executive Council was powerless. By 1891,
Marxism as interpreted by the German Social Democrats, became
the lingua franca of the International.
Though the colonial question was of growing, though sec-
ondary importance, the International Congresses spent little
time on the issue before 1900. A normal order of business was
to roundly denounce Britain's colonial policy in India. In
the London Congress of 1896, George Lansbury, an I.L.P. member,
proposed a resolution, which was unanimously adopted, that all
73. Not only did the anarchists lead to the demise of the
First International, through their anti-authoritarianism,
but a small faction of bomb-throwing radicals had given
the entire group a poor reputation. Most "respectable"
socialists feared that the anarchists would give this bad
name to the whole movement.
74. Gerhart Niemeyer, "The Second International, 1889-1914"
in Milorad Drachkovitch, ed. , The Revolutionary Internationals
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nations have the "right ... to complete sovereignty." He
continued by denouncing colonialism as an expression of cap-
italism. "With whatever pretexts colonial policies may be
justified in the name of religion or civilization," Lansbury
resolved, "their sole aim is simply to extend the area of
capitalist exploitation in the exclusive interests of the
capitalist class. "'~>
When the International met again in Septamber, 1900, in
Paris, the colonial question was more pressing because of recent
events in China and South Africa. It was at this point that
the German orthodox faction successfully linked the whole
question of imperialism with the arms race and the increased
danger of armed conflict. Colonialism was equated with war
and increased militarism, making it a much easier concept to
renounce. The question of the formulation of a socialist col-
onial policy was dealt with as a side issue of the Commission
discussing world peace and militarism.
The leader of the Dutch Social Democrats, H. Van Kol,
resolved that colonialism be rejected without reservation.
Since colonialism was an inevitable accompaniment of capitalism,
he reasoned, its sole purpose was to provide an "increase in
76
capitalist profit and the maintenance of the capitalist system."




The management of imperial powers had committed "crimes and
cruelties without number against the native inhabitants of the
colonies, subjugated by force of arms." His conclusion was
that socialists should fight against colonial expansion in or-
der to end the cruelty inflicted on the natives. Van Kol,
thereby, began to show signs of paternalistic concern for the
colonial, while rejecting colonialism.
H. M. Hyndman, noted above, concurred with this view in
1900. He protested Britain's action by noting that England's
war against the Transvaal filled "us English Socialists with
77
mourning and shame." His colleague, Quelch, added, that
"despite all the systematic attempts by capitalist England to
corrupt them," the British workers had kept their honor, and
not endorsed the war.
At this point, Richard Geraut, representative from the
French colony of Guadaloupe, proposed that it was insufficient
merely to denounce colonialism. A detailed socialist Program
in the colonies should be worked out by the International. All
national parties were enjoined to consider the matter between
meetings of the International Congress.





unanimously, averred that recent events (Boer War, Boxer Inter-
vention) had given militarism a new significance. It had
become an instrument of imperial expansion and control, thereby
accentuating colonial rivalries and accelerating the drive
toward general war. The resolution called upon all workers to
"oppose with re-doubled strength and vigour both militarism
and colonialism." It exhorted socialist parliamentary groups
to "vote unfailingly against all estimates for military and
naval expenditures or for colonial aggression." 78
The Paris Congress was the last occasion on which a unan-
imous position toward colonialism was taken by the European
socialists. Until then, all pronouncements of the International
were couched in an orthodox, revolutionary rhetoric, decrying
imperial abuses and forecasting the eventual doom of capitalism.
However, before 1900, the colonial question was not a signifi-
cant issue in practical socialist politics, and could be treated
as mere verbiage. Subsequent to this watershed, those reform-
ists with pro-colonial tendencies (for any number of reasons),
were no longer embarassed to assert them. Colonialism was
becoming popular domestically in Europe, and socialists were
quick to see that their political position could be enhanced
by adopting a more realistic, positive colonial policy.
78. Ibid., p. 310.
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At the Amsterdam Congress of 1904, a Colonial Commission
was formed, with Van Kol and Hyndman as its rapporteurs. The
Dutchman admitted that the Commission was not unanimous in its
opinions, and was forced to qualify its previous stand on col-
onialism. Van Kol insisted that colonialism was a consequence
of capitalism, but questioned whether it was necessary to con-
demn every colonial possession, under any circumstances. He
answered in the negative:
The new needs which will make themselves felt after the
victory of the working class and its economic emancipation
will make the possession of colonies necessary, even
under the future socialist system of government. Modern
countries will no longer be able to get along without
countries furnishing certain raw materials and tropical
products indispensable ta. industry and the needs of
humanity, and this will be the case as long as they can-
not be procured by the exchange of products of native
79industry and commerce.
He then expounded on Bernstein's argument concerning the
"conditional right to land" of the natives by noting that the
interest of all humanity would be served if Europeans were
allowed to control the cultivation of the earth. He objected
to the hypothesis that some countries would be able to bypass
the capitalist mode of production in their economic development.
79. All citations from the Amsterdam Congress are taken from
Congres Socialiste Internationale d' Amsterdam des 14-20 Aout
1904
,
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He insisted that "the primitive peoples" must be willing to
"bear this cross."
The Dutch leader thus concretized the paternalism rationale,
thought optimistically predicting a time when "these inferior
races . . . will no longer need our tutelage." He passionately
asked his colleagues, "Can we abandon hundreds of thousands
to infinite misery, to intellectual and moral degradation, in-
stead of protecting them against capitalism?"
This concern with the colonial natives was mitigated sub-
stantially, when Van Kol expressed his immediate concern for
Europe
:
. . . all that is a question of the far off future. For
a long time to come we. shall have to protect ourselves
against backward forms of production, and from now on,
the workers of civilized countries will have to secure
themselves against the deadly competition of colonial
labor.
His attitude, though paternalistic, remained quintessentially
"Western."
He reiterated the socialist pledge to work for colonial
self-government, but his resolution demanded that a colony's
degree of freedom and independence must approximate its "appro-
priate stage of development."
Thus, the Van Kol resolution marked a significant retreat
from the spontaneous position taken in 1900. Certain consist-
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ent themes were apparent, including a denunciation of the excesses
of colonial management, a desire for eventual colonial independ-
ence, and the relation of colonialism to militarism. But a
fundamental condemnation of colonialism in principle, was no
longer universally accepted by European socialists. Rather,
serious consideration was given to the postulate that socialism
could impart the necessary moral guidance and efficient manage-
ment required to effect a colonial policy both productive for
the metropole and benign toward the colonies.
Hyndman's resolution was merely another indictment of
British management of India, though it, too, wavered on funda-
mental condemnation. It called on British workers to support
the abandonment of the colonial practices of coercion and sub-
jugation, but never advocated the total abandonment of the
colonies. In part, it read:
The Congress recognizes the right of the inhabitants of
civilized countries to settle in lands where the popula-
tion is at a lower stage of development. However, it
condemns most strongly the existing capitalist system of
colonial rule. The system results in the oppression of
the people of Asia, Africa, etc., by the culturally ad-
vanced nations of Europe ....
The Congress calls on the workers of Great Britain to
compel their government to abandon its present infamous
and degrading colonial system and to introduce the
perfectly practicable system of self-government for the
Indian People under English Sovereignty, (italics added)
Despite this somewhat less then "orthodox" view of the
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colonial question by the International Socialist Congress of
Amsterdam, it appeared that. the delegates honestly felt that
they represented an unequivocal condemnation of imperialism.
A similar situation obtained in the German S.P.D., which felt
(but for a few revisionists) that it was an umconpromising
revolutionary Marxist party, though its actions characterized
it as one of parliamentarism and reform. Neither group admitted,
in theory, to the position its activity demanded.
After adopting Hyndman's resolution, which effectively
supported the principle of colonization, the socialist delegates
rose from their seats, as an expression of sympathy for the
Indian people. Tumultuous cheers greeted Dadhabhai NaQjori,
the founder and president of the Indian National Congress,
shortly after the socialists had resolved to continue the ex-
traction of colonial wealth, if ever given the opportunity.
The German Social Democrats had religiously opposed all
of Germany's imperial endeavors until this time. A majority
sided against governmental policy in the Chinese expedition
of 1900, the Baghdad railway concession, and the Moroccan Crisis
of 1905. This opposition had no practical effect on policy,
since it was usually offered after the fact. However, in
December, 1905, Ledebour led an assault on German policy in
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South West Africa. An indigenous uprising had been quelled
with brutal atrocities by the German occupiers. When the
government asked the Reichstag for new credits to finance the
campaign, the Social Democrats demurred, along with the Centrist
Party. This parliamentary defeat prompted Kaiser Wilhelm to
dissolve the Reichstag and to call the "Hottentot Election"
of 1907. In it, S.P.D. suffered a signal defeat, losing thirty-
eight of its eighty-one members in the Reichstag. °®
It became readily apparent to a majority of Europe's lar-
gest socialist party, that not only was the electorate highly
nationalistic, but also that a definite jingoist spirit per-
vaded the air. The Revisionists were galvanized, suggesting
that the "negative colonial policy" of the S.P.D. yield to one
that was more "realistic and positive." It appeared that mass
socialist support in Germany could not obtain if the party
adamantly adhered to a colonial policy of "condemnation in
principle.
"
The Belgian Social Democrats also discussed the necessity
of a "realistic" colonial policy, but arrived at a slightly
different conclusion. In 1906, King Leopold declared that he
80. Kaiser Wilhelm allegedly tampered with the election returns
in order to effect this drastic loss of representation for the
S.P.D. The Party garnered 29.2% of the total vote, down from




would transfer the Congo (his personal possession) to Belgium
for certain concessions. The Social Democrats were confronted
with the situation of voting to annex the Congo or to allow it
to fall into the hands of an International Consortium.
Vandervelde, the prestigious head of the Belgian Socialsts,
advocated annexation, on the grounds that Belgium would be less
likely to "perpetuate colonial exploitation" than a regime of
capitalist powers. Since it would be under parliamentary
control, the rights of the natives could be safe-guarded. How-
ever, a narrow majority of the Party refused to follow Vander-
velde' s lead. The resolution adopted by the Belgian S.P.D.
declared that socialist deputies who favored annexation were
"defying the principle agreed to by Congresses of the Party and
Go
the International.
By the convening of the next Socialist International Con-
gress in August, 1907, at Stuttgart, colonialism had devel-
oped into a central topic of debate among socialists. It stood
not only as a concomitant of militarism, but was considered a
topic which had to be addressed exclusively and directly by
the International. 00 The only consensus centered around the
81. Braunthal, Op. cit.
, p. 315.
82. Ibid.
83. The Stuttgart Congress of 1907 discussed the question of
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fact that colonialism, as managed by profit-mongering capit-
alists, had perpetrated evils and atrocities upon the colonial
natives. In this sense, the socialists assumed a pristine
quality of innocence with relation to the capitalists, the
victims of historical guilt by association with the coloniz-
ing states.
The Colonial Commission of the Congress was comprised of
members from eighteen states, with Van Kol once again acting
as rapporteur. Exhaustive memoranda on the colonial policies
of the major European states were discussed. However, the
debate again revolved around the question whether colonialism
should be rejected out of hand, or be utilized by socialists
for developing the productive powers of mankind.
Edouard David of Germany, while criticizing the manage-
ment of contemporary capitalism, resolved that the Commission
accept the principle of colonization "on the grounds that the
occupation and exploitation of the entire world are indispens-
able for the well-being of humanity." He concluded, "Europe
militarism in a separate commission. Other central topics
addressed were woman suffrage, emigration, and the party-
syndicate relationship.
84. All citations from the Stuttgart Congress Colonial Commis-
sion are taken from Compte Rendu Congres Socialiste Interna-
tional de Stuttgart, (Brussels, 1908,) pp. 216-228 passim.
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needs colonies. It does not even have enough of them. Without
colonies, we should be comparable, from an economic standpoint,
to China."
His German adversary, Ledebour, criticized David for not
recognizing that "these abominations cannot be avoided," because
they were the direct results of capitalism. He suggested that
no progress in civilization could derive from a colonialist
policy, and this oppression must be combatted on all fronts.
Terwagne, leading the Belgian delegation on the Commission,
recommended that the following introduction be added to the
resolution: "The Congress does not condemn in principle and
for all time, every colonial policy; under a socialist regime,
colonialization can be a work of civilization."
The leading French delegate on the Commission, Rouanet,
agreed with Terwagne' s motion, noting that "colonization is
an historical fact; ... it is all too easy to blame every-
thing on capitalism and to saddle it with all the crimes of
civilization." He suggested that Europeans use colonies to
better the economic situation of their own countries.
David then moved that the Commission adopt the policy
that "socialism needs the productive forces of the entire globe,
destined to be put at the disposal of humanity, and to raise
peoples of all colours and languages to the highest culture."
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Further, he suggested that an integral aim of socialist colon-
ial policy be the civilizing of the world.
Effectively reversing the Belgian socialist position of
1906, Terwagne asked, "Shall we leave the Congo in the state
in which it is, or else do we want to better conditions there?
Do not close the door to the future!" He insisted that the
riches of the globe belong to all men, and must be utilized.
The resolution which was agreed to by a majority of the
Commission (18-10) contained amendments by the reformists
Rouanet and Van Kol. Also incorporated was an amendment sub-
mitted by the radical, Wurm, tying colonialism to militarism.
Only David's amendment was rejected. The text of the majority
resolution read as follows:
Majority Resolution
The Congress, while noting that in general the utility
and the necessity of colonies, in particular for the
working class, is greatly exaggerated, does not condemn
in principle and for all time, every colonial policy;
under a socialist regime, colonization can be a work of
civilization.
Reaffirming its resolutions of Paris (1900) and of
Amsterdam (1904) , the Congress rejects the present col-
onization which, being intrinsically capitalistic, has
no other objective than to conquer countries and to sub-
jugate peoples in order to exploit them mercilessly for
the profit of a very small minority, all the while in-
creasing the burden of the proletarians of the mother
country.
Enemy of all exploitation of man by man, defender of
all the oppressed without distinction of race, the Con-
gress condemns this policy of robbery and conquest, this
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shameless application of the right of the strongest, which
tramples on the rights of conquered peoples, and further
notes that colonial policy increases the danger of inter-
national complications and of wars between colonizing
countries .... The Congress declares that the socialist
representatives have the duty to oppose unconditionally
in all the parliaments this regime of unbridled exploit-
ation and serfdom, which is prevalent in all the existing
colonies, by insisting on reforms to better the lot of
the natives, by seeing to the maintenance of their rights,
by preventing all forms of exploitation and enslavement,
and by working, by all the means at their disposal, to
educate these peoples for independence.
The Colonial Commission transmitted this resolution to
the Plenary Session of the Congress, while a minority group led
by Ledebour, Wurm, DeLaporte, Bracke, and Karski submitted an-
other version. The latter resolution incorporated the bulk of
the majority resolution, but it deleted the first paragraph
completely and inserted the following:
The Congress is of the opinion that capitalist colonial
policy, by its very essence, leads inevitable to the
enslavement, forced labour, or extermination of the native
population in the colonial domain. The civilizing mission
claimed by capitalist society is only used as a pretext
to cover its thirst for exploitation and conquest. Only
socialist society will be able to offer to all peoples
the possibility of fully developing their civilization.
This minority was suggesting that any policy entailing
forcible colonization would be counter-productive, but still
alluded to European superiority and the need to develop the
85. All citations from Plenary Session, Ibid., pp. 284-329 passim.
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civilizations of lower peoples, though only by example. Though
the reformist majority favored an active policy of civilizing
and profiting, a faction of this group showed a greater pro-
pensity to be responsible for the plight of the natives. The
difference in outlook was not as great as the ensuing debate
in the Plenary Session would indicate.
Van Kol defended tha majority resolution as realistic and
positive, while the minority report revealed a "sombre spirit
of despair and doubt." He specifically defended Dutch colonial
practices, as having evolved from "killing, torture, and plunder"
toward more peaceful and humanitarian principles. Since colon-
ies were inevitable, he argued, they ought to be used to best
advantage. He noted that the" colonies were the only solution
to the potential overpopulation of Europe and the increasing
glut of European industrial goods. His most emotional plea,
was to encourage the Congress to fulfill its "duty to work for
the improvement of the backward peoples." The socialists must
improve the degree of colonial civilization and see to it that
the "millions of unhappy natives" be provided a better future.
Bernstein debated for the majority resolution by offering
that abandonment of the colonies was a "utopian idea," which a
growing political force could never subscribe to. He bluntly
admitted that "a certain tutelage of the civilized peoples over
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the uncivilized peoples is a necessity." Here, he quoted Marx,
in Volume III of Capital : "The earth does not belong to a
single people, but to humanity, and each people should manage
it to the advantage of humanity."
His cohort, David, added that if the colonies were aband-
oned, only barbarism could truimph. He insisted that colonialiam
was an historical necessity. "The colonies, too, must pass
through capitalism. One does not pass from savagery to social-
iam in a single leap."
The radical Karski countered that Marx had stated only
that all peoples who had experienced the beginnings of capit-
alist development need go through the evolution completely. He
blamed the Europeans for attempting to foist their civilization
on those "asiatic peoples who possess a culture much more ancient
than ours, and perhaps much more refined." He foresaw cultural
development, rather than barbarism, as the consequence of a
total abandonment of colonial practices.
Karl Kautsky then lent his sizable influence to the or-
thodox cause. He exhorted that the primary task of socialism
was to liberate the "toiling masses of the world" from the chains
of capital. Since colonialism was the direct antithesis of re-
volution, Europe could not force the blessings of civilization
on the natives. He defined any colonial policy as being the
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direct opposite of a civilizing policy.
However, even Kautsky was determined to civilize the sav-
ages. He suggested that they would accept the "help of a super-
ior civilization" only if it were offered as friendly aid from
European workers. Of course, this could occur only after the
Socialist Revolution had transformed Europe into a co-operative
commonwea 11h
.
Van Kol proferred a final defense of the Commission's
resolution with an exhortation to the members to be responsible
for all the world's oppressed: "Why should we not help the
workers of other continents, as we help the workers of Europe?"
He reasoned, that, in order to gain their confidence, as Kautsky
had suggested, something positive must be done for them. The
Dutch socialists, he bragged, had won the confidence of thou-
sands of Javanese by actively intervening in the colonies, while
the Germans had no such accomplishment. Because the natives
of Africa were cannibals, Van Kol asserted, "we must go there
with weapons in our hands, even if Kautsky chooses to call that
imperialism.
"
This last-ditch defense was insufficient to stop the de-
feat of the majority resolution in the Plenary Session, by a
vote of 128-107, with Switzerland abstaining. The voting break-
down was of interest: every European socialist party whose
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country had engaged in colonialism gave some, if not total sup-
port to the majority resolution. (See Table I.) There also
appeared to be a relation between the parliamentary power of a
socialist party, and its willingness to support the majority
resolution. Inevitably, a party which was realistically in a
situation in which it might assume control of government was
likely to engage in "practical politics."
The unique voting system adopted at Stuttgart, a compro-
mise of the principle of "one-country, one-vote" and proportional
representation, allowed twenty votes for the largest parties,
and two for the smallest. In effect, Europe, which had the
vast majority of delegates and party members, was grossly under-
represented by this system. Had a proportional system been
utilized, the Commission's majority resolution would have car-
ried by a margin of two to one, since the vast preponderance of
European delegates opted for it.
Though this vote signalled a victory of the orthodox
attitude toward colonialism, the fundamental differences with
the position of the reformists were inconsequential. The debate
revolved around whether colonialism could be a useful "civiliz-
ing" tool in the hands of the socialists. However, both sides
agreed that the natives were an inferior race, and did require









delegates For Against Abst. (*=yes) (*=yes)
Germany 289 20 * *
Austria (German) 25 4 *
Bohemia 41 12 *
Belgium 27 15 * *
Denmark 17 10 * *
England 123 6 14 * *
France 78 8 12 * *
Holland 9 5 * *
Italy 13 11 4 * *
Sweden 19 ^ 10 *
S. Africa 1 2
Austria (Italian) 25 4





USA 22 15 *
Finland 2 2 *
Hungary 25 15





Norway 8 5 *
Switzerland 10 10
Total 884 127 108 10
Source: Compte Rendu Congres Socialiste Internationale
de Stuttgart 1907, (Brussels, 1908,) pp. 325-326.
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happen only through example. Only Karski credited the Asians
with the possession of an equal of superior civilization.
Both groups were predominantly interested in the plight
of the European worker in classic "Western" fashion. The ortho-
dox group emphasized that the European proletariat must first
reap the benefits of the revolution before the colonial question
could be resolved. The reformists saw immediate benefits for
Europe in embarking on a "positive colonial policy." The ortho-
dox policy of avoidance was rooted in the Kaustkian belief that
historic inevitability obviated the need for any revolutionary
activity in the colonies. Indeed, any policy other than avoid-
ance would distract them from the European Revolution. Minim-
ally, the radicals and the reformists agreed that capitalist
colonialism was evil and poorly managed. Eventual independence
for the colonies was a consensual goal.
Thus, colonialism was "condemned in principle," but not
by a majority of European socialists. These delegates voted
overwhelmingly in favor of a "positive socialist colonial policy."
Further, this Congress' condemnation was not meant to imply in-
ternational equality. It decried capitalist management of col-
onies, while avoiding any collective responsibility for them.
With this resolution, the International Congress laid to
rest the colonial issue. This occurence is most likely tied
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to the fact that, by 1910, few socialists envisaged a war start-
ing over a colonial issue. Temporarily defeated, the alliance
of the nationalists and revisionists would continue its struggle
against orthodox Marxism in the subsequent battle on militarism
and entry into the First World War. However, any united, in-
ternational advocacy of "realistic colonialism" by socialists,
had ceased.
At this time, the Russian socialists were only beginning
to make their mark on the international socialist movement.
Initially, the Bolsheviks, led by Nikolai Bukharin and V. I.
Lenin, espoused the Western orthodox position on colonialism.
Bukharin noted that colonies were a regressive factor,
slowing the pace of revolution, because they provided a colossal
income to the great powers, allowing them to raise workers'
wages at the expense of the colonial savages. The main reason
that Europe and America had been free from socialist revolution
had been because a "safety valve was opened in the form of col-
onial Policy." 86
Lenin found some virtue in colonialism, in 1907, because
it brought the colonies closer to the class tensions of Europe.






The example of European socialism could be better transmitted
to the underdeveloped areas of the world throuah it, and the
natives would be better able to "wage a victorious struggle
against the oppressors." '
Lenin praised Kautsky's defense of the Minority Resolution
at Stuttgart, on the grounds that colonialism was based on en-
slavement. The civilizing potential of colonialism, Lenin
stated, was bankrupt: "The bourgeoisie was introducing virtual
slavery into the colonies and subjecting the native populations
to untold indignities and violence, "civilizing 1 them by the
88
spread of alcohol and syphilis."
He agreed with Engels that imperialism possessed the cap-
acity to create privileged categories of workers and break them
away from the broad mass of the proletariat. By bribing this
upper stratum of the lower classes, imperialism "fosters, shapes,
and reinforces opportunism." ^
Lenin's concluding "Western" reason for depicting colon-
ialism as regressive was that the economic position of the West-
ern proletariat was undermined by the colonies. The capitalists




89. Ibid., Vol. XXVII, p. 374.
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were provided an effective alternative not only to market their
products, but also to seek cheap labor. European labor would
lose much bargaining power, as it became less essential in the
production process.
In his essay, Imperialism : The Highest Stage of Capital -
ism , Lenin acknowledged the prior contributions of J. A. Hobson
and Rudolf Hilferding, by labelling colonialism as "economically
inspired by monopoly capital."" Imperialism, the "foreign
policy of finance capital," was necessarily characterized by
domination and violence.
This piece was written, partly to refute the concept of
qi
"Ultra-Imperialism" set forth by Karl Kautsky. The German
held that, though socialists ought to fight against annexation,
imperialism was less likely to cause a major war because the
major colonizers were combining in their colonial pursuits.
This union of world imperialisms would provide for joint exploit-
ation of colonial wealth and improve great-power relations.
90. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism : The Highest Stage of Capitalism
,
(New York, 1939,) p. 1.
91. Kautsky introduced the term, "Ultra-Imperialism" in an
article in Die Neue Zeit in 1913, calling it a "phase of the
joint exploitation of the world by internationally combined
finance capital." Lenin's response was most likely so strong,
because he felt betrayed by this past champion of Marxist or-
thodoxy. Kautsky was merely labelling the prevailing socialist
attitude, that colonialism would not likely lead to war.
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92Lenin insisted that ultra-imperialism was "impossible."
However, Lenin was not destined to lead a "Western" soci-
alist party, and his instinct as a Russian revolutionary drew
him from his conditioned Marxian position. He operated within
the concept of the "Asiatic Mode of Production" until 1917, but
as early as 1906, he began to water down the term "asiatic"
into "medieval" or "patriarchal." Immediately after the
October Revolution, he applied the concept of nationalism to
the Asiatic tribes of Russia.
Thus, he took a more "Eastern" approach to the colonial
question. He held that capitalism must be. attacked at its weakest
point (the underdeveloped world) and suggested that self-deter-
mination and socialism were possible in the non-industrial states
of Asia. This attitude imputed racial and cultural equality
to the Asiatics. It acknowledged that the Eastern socialist
revolution would not only be temporally prior to that of the
West, but also that it possessed equal or greater significance.
This altered position was likely a tactical expedient,
with the aim of hoping to disunite the Asiatic tribes of Russia
from either the Tsarist or "white" cause, and contributing to
a favorable outcome of the Russian Civil War. Lenin, thereby,
92. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism , Op. cit
.
, p. 109.




harnessed nationalism as a potent revolutionary force, and
established and solidified his political position. In effect,
this "Eastern View" toward the colonies (or in his case, the
Asiatic tribes,) was a self-serving political tactic, used just
as in the West, to gain local popular support and political
power
.
Even Italy experienced the shock effects of the colonial
question upon socialism, though several years after it had sub-
sided in the rest of Europe. In 1911, the Government intended
to annex Tripolitania and declare war against the decadent Tur-
kish Empire. The Socialist Party protested against this as a
frivolous adventure. However, a reformist wing, led by Bissolati
and Bonomi, argued vehemently for the war credits requested.
In 1912, at the Congress of Reggio Emilia, the reformist min-
ority split from the party, as the young, radical leader, Benito
.
. 94Mussloini, took control of the central party.
Conclusions
European socialism, and primarily those socialists of the
Second International, were unable to transcend their parochial
proclivities and to deal with colonialism on the ethical basis
demanded by their equalitarian ideology. The reasons for this





failure can be traced to the ideological and political dilemmas
faced by Karl Marx and his heirs.
A definite "Western" outlook was always prevalent in
socialist ideology. The philosophy grew out of the contradic-
tions emanating from Western, industrial states, and was geared
to deal exclusively with these problems. The Marxian legacy
emphasized the need to industrialize and to pass through the
various modes of production enroute to socialism. In retrospect,
this historic progression defines the path taken by a minority
of the world's states. To most, it was irrelevant. Europe be-
came the focal point, according to European socialists, and
her example had to be emulated. The national framework into
which this ideology was injected also reinforced this Western
attitude. In the nineteenth century, Europe became infected
with nationalism, and increasingly, any movement which would
win popular support, would possess some nationalistic attributes.
A minimum requirement for this support was that the party work
in the interest of the European masses. Thus, the paradox:
in order to gain the requisite support of Europeans, the soc-
ialists were forced to employ political tactics which de-emphas-
ized and perverted the fundamental concept of universal equality.
Responses to this dilemma were posed by two conflicting
schools of thought. However, they possessed certain commonal-
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ities. Inherent in the entire debate was the recognition of
European economic and cultural superiority. Non-Europeans
were rarely credited with the ability to attain independence,
much less socialism, without at least minimum guidance from
Europe. The colonies were invariably treated purely as economic
entities by the "Western" outlook.
A touchstone of all Western socialists was the incapacity
and inefficiency of colonialism, as managed by capitalists.
This common acknowledgement of selfish capitalist interests
was understandable, since any attempt to discredit capitalism
was instrumental in adding to socialist power. However, this
criticism amounted to an opportunistic exploitation of hist-
orical guilt, rather than an inherent indictment of the ine-
qualities of colonialism.
Socialism's apparent antipathy for foreign policy issues
was a logical consequence of the domestic roots of the philo-
sophy. This, however, helped keep the colonial question a
peripheral issue for socialists until it was utterly unavoid-
able. Then, the response was necessarily confused, since
little practical policy on the matter had been formulated.
The initial response, then as now, was the conditioned soci-
alist reflex: to quote from orthodox Marxist scripture.
These common attributes shaped the two basic Western re-
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sponses to the colonial question: orthodox and reformist.
The orthodox school emphasized the goal of European re-
volution, and adhered strictly to the Marxian principle of
increasing misery. They evaluated colonies as these depen-
dencies affected the inevitability of the revolution and the
economic situation of the European worker. Colonies could
only be considered advantageous, if they accelerated the
inevitable revolution.
From these tenets derive what will be labelled the West-
ern orthodox "policy of avoidance" toward the colonies. Since
its primary concern was with Europe, this faction felt no
overriding responsibility toward the tropical colonies, beyond
the ambiguous "unity of the oppressed" slogan of socialism.
However, it became apparent that colonies were rich in resources
of wealth to the metropole, placing capitalism in a position
to bribe the proletariat with benefits. The presence of col-
onies endangered the trend toward increasing class-conscious-
ness.
Additionally, colonies increased the likelihood of a Eur-
opean war because of the higher statistical probability of
conflict between adjacent colonizing garrisons. This impending
war, it was commonly felt before 1910, would set back the re-
volution by galvanizing nationalist tendencies and offering
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excusses for the repression of socialist revolutionaries.
Many potential socialists would also be killed fighting the
war. Finally, much of the socialist reaction toward militar-
ism did stem from a bona fide sense of pacifism.
The orthodox Marxists were, therefore, forced into this
ideological position. They could not defend even a benign
form of colonialism, because its very existence endangered
their ultimate goal of revolution. They were forced to fabri-
cate theories which called for its complete abandonment. They
retreated to their only defensible position: that of ignoring
and avoiding colonial policy by condemning it "in principle"
and suggesting that all colonies be set free. A sense of col-
lective responsibility was unallowable.
The Western reformists were concerned with the immediate
achievements of socialist and liberal reforms. Since they
ceased believing in the inevitability of revolution they wel-
comed any improvement of the workers' position. They saw, in
benign colonialism, a tool which could produce these results.
Their tactic of doctrinal flexibility lent itself to gar-
nering popular support, but also enslaved the revisionists to
the whims of public opinion. As a group, they demanded a
better-managed, more humane brand of colonialism, as well as
benefits for the Europeans, very much in the liberal tradition.
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However, other popular tendencies also polluted this altruistic
stance. Many espoused a certain national superiority, and
demanded special colonial considerations. Several viewed col-
onialism as a method to enhance one's state's relative military
power and influence. Others were simply jingoists, caught by
the spirit of the age.
However, a small number of notable exceptions also mani-
fested some sense of compassion and responsibility for the
tropical natives. They proposed that the indigenous tribes
share in the wealth created by colonial trade. Though they
often spoke in the grandiloquent terms of "enhancing inter-
national civilization," there was, no doubt, an intention to
assume some responsibility for" the physical and economic well-
being of the natives.
All reformists of this period engaged in what Semmel calls
"Social Imperialism," or the attempt to create a mass base for
imperialism by providing material and psychic rewards for the
European worker. 5 However, this last group of reformists adds
a new dimension to this phenomenon. It attempts to make im-
perialism more palatable to all involved, by offering humane
and charitable management of colonies, while improving the
physical situation in the colonies.




Both Western attitudes fail as pure expressions of the
egalitarianism which pervades socialist theory. Though the
"Eastern" view lends significance to the equality of non-
European politics and cultures, it remains the self-serving,
instrumental tool of a revolutionary, hoping to eventually
subjugate the same tribes he incited toward self-determination
and socialism. In practice, it became the tool of Great-
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